";s:4:"text";s:37927:"There are several important observations about the distribution of strategies. Except for the sprinting strategy, states pursuing nuclear weapons do not consider speed of paramount importance. This article seeks to fill that gap. The state must be relatively unconcerned with external powers knowing its intent and capabilities. Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegieâs Nuclear Policy Program. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. Libya's President Muammar Gaddafi is rumored to have sent an aide to ask Chinese leaders on March 24, 1970, to sell him nuclear weapons. With clarity and expertise, Joseph Cirincione presents an even-handed look at the history of nuclear proliferation and an optimistic vision of its future, providing a comprehensive survey of the wide range of critical perspectives. Shastri, who became prime minister following Nehru's death, in May 1964, professed an even stronger aversion to nuclear weapons than Nehru, whose abhorrence of nuclear weapons was counterbalanced by his recognition that India could not be the lone proponent of nuclear abolition in a nuclear-armed world. Narasimha Rao Transformed India (Delhi: Penguin India, 2016), p. 281. Vipin Narang; Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb. Once a state has sufficient weapons-grade fissile material, it must machine weapons cores and develop explosive designs to compress the cores so that they go critical and sustain a fission reaction, yielding energy on the scale of 15–20 kilotons for a basic fission weapon. See Samuels and Schoff, “Japan's Nuclear Hedge.”. This is a key difference in motivations from that presented in Kampani, “New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey.” The military may have believed that secrecy resulted from a desire to avoid potential counterproliferation efforts, but my interviews with civilian managers suggest that they siloed the program because they were much more concerned with managing its pace internally. Since the beginning of the nuclear age proliferation, first confined to American concerns over the USSR achieving their own nuclear technology, has been a major concern. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to build nuclear weapons appear onerous today. This volume provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date collection of theoretical perspectives regarding the sources of and propensity for nuclear proliferation. Thank you for using our website to find The Sun 2-Speed Crossword Answers. The Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program works to strengthen international security by diagnosing acute nuclear risks, informing debates on solutions, and engaging international actors to effect change. Premier Zhou Enlai flatly refused, telling the emissary that Libya should build its own.37 All of the nuclear weapons states have balked at similar requests, because no state wants to make itself a target for potential nuclear retaliation as a result of decisions taken by another state—and there is little reason to think that this is likely to change.38 Other possibilities, such as “bluffing”—pretending to have a greater capability than one actually has—are not strategies of proliferation, but rather strategies of deterrence, and are therefore distinct. 40, No. Major powers should be aware that offering temporary immunity to potential proliferators that have sudden geopolitical importance may have significant long-term implications for nuclear proliferation. In order to be suitable for use as reactor fuel, naturally-occurring uranium must be enriched. Every nuclear pursuer in the historical record has chosen one of these strategies, and it is difficult to imagine a future proliferator choosing anything else. But because of a lack of domestic political consensus, it stopped short of an active strategy to acquire nuclear weapons. She genuinely felt horrified by the bomb.”74 In late 1982 or early 1983, India's scientists approached Indira Gandhi to request approval for a series of nuclear-related experiments—failing to mention that they really wanted to initiate a series of tests for weapons development.75 After tentatively relenting, but then realizing what she was being asked to approve and the implications, she retracted the authorization within hours, according to Defence Research and Development Organisation head V.S. This book examines the state of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the issues it faces in the early 21st century. Mapping Algeria's threat assessment in this period to the objective indicators set forth earlier—a conventionally superior proximate offensive threat or a primary adversary with nuclear weapons—is difficult. Author's interview with Naresh Chandra, New Delhi, December 30, 2015. Also see Kanti Bajpai et al., Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (Delhi: Manohar, 1995). The PNE dramatically suggested that India had the ability, at some future time, to weaponize its nuclear capabilities, but that India had not yet chosen to do so. The following typology meets these requirements. According to Waltz, proliferation would bring more peace for the following reasons: Nuclear weapons make war less likely because nuclear weapons encourage both defense and deterrence. It faces underlying security threats from a nuclear-armed China and North Korea, but has a formal alliance with the United States and is protected under its nuclear umbrella. the risk of nuclear proliferation. Acquisition dates are from Philipp Bleek, “Does Proliferation Beget Proliferation? In sum, this article suggests that each of these proliferation strategies provides different points of vulnerability that can be exploited by nonproliferation efforts. See Yogesh Joshi, “How Technology Shaped India's Nuclear Submarine Program,” Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2016, p. 25. Another exception is France, which, according to my theory, should have selected an insurance hedging strategy. 6; and Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, chap. For example, after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan suddenly found itself on the frontline of the Cold War and took advantage of U.S. shelter to redouble its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.35 With major power protection, the chances of achieving a nuclear weapons capability are high. The theory correctly predicts 41 of 47 strategies, a success rate of more than 85 percent. The theory is structured as a decision tree that, from the view of a state's political leaders, asks: Given the external and domestic political environment, which strategy of proliferation should the state optimally choose? Nuclear Proliferation Problems Introduction A projection of nuclear power and its associated industry B. I. Spinrad Fast breeder reactors B. M. Jasani Uranium enrichment technologies and the demand for enriched uranium P. Boskma Nuclear fuel fabrication plants B. M. Jasani Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants B. M. Jasani Uranium enrichment and the proliferation of nuclear weapons P. Boskma More items... Second, the framework explicitly treats the nuclear proliferation process as a spectrum, allowing for states to progress through various stages and strategies on the pathway to developing a nuclear weapons capability. HERE are many translated example sentences containing "ASPECT OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION" - english-french translations and search engine for english translations. 225–244; Jacques E.C. Definition 1: A situation in which countries that are enemies each try to build or collect weapons faster than the other can . Controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, is of great international concern. The bulk of the proliferation literature focuses on why states want nuclear weapons. The result was a relatively open weaponization of India's nuclear capabilities over the next five years, including regular and public tests of explicitly nuclear-capable missiles beginning in May 1989. For states vulnerable to prevention but lacking major power shelter, the only available strategy is hiding. Vajpayee quoted in Sitapati, Half Lion, p. 279. On India's nuclear history, see Sumit Ganguly, “India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security, Vol. In March 1989, nine months after Rajiv's failed UN speech, Rajiv discreetly ordered Naresh Chandra,97 his newly appointed defense secretary, to take India's nuclear program over the finish line; the result was “a dramatic change of pace in India's nuclear weapons plans.”98 Cabinet Secretary Deshmukh indicated that the steps were now clearly laid out: “when the trigger would be ready, what type of platform would carry the bomb, how the bomb was to be mated to a delivery vehicle, the type of electronic checks and the command and control system needed. Second, if so, does it confront that security threat alone or does it have a formal alliance with a major power that mitigates the severity of the underlying threat? SAFEGUARDS AND EXTENSION OF THE TREATY. Knowing how a potential nuclear pursuer may go about trying to acquire nuclear weapons provides additional avenues to halt nuclear weapons proliferation. Potential Indicators for Varieties of Hedging. Although beset by some challenges when the military was finally tasked with marrying the bombs to the delivery aircraft, India's progress in the sprinting phase was not significantly slower than that of other nuclear states. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements. Indeed, after China's successful boosted fission test in 1966, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh stated to parliament: “[T]he government still feels that the interests of … our own security are better achieved by giving all support to the efforts for world nuclear disarmament than by building our own nuclear weapons.”70 Work on peaceful nuclear explosives continued, however, and debate about whether India should develop nuclear weapons was now both salient and public. First, in an often strained security relationship spanning more than five decades, U.S. and Proliferation of Nuclear Wearpons / 3 To summarize the point: The most difficult technical barrier for the production of nuclear weapons is access to the required nuclear material. Second, if the state seeks only the option to weaponize in the future, under what conditions might it break out and fully weaponize, and where does it want to stop on the spectrum of its program?17 If it does seek nuclear weapons, then it must consider how to go about developing them. Unsurprisingly, however, the frequency of hiding as a proliferation strategy rises in the so-called third generation of pursuers that have emerged since the end of the Cold War, for reasons noted earlier. The Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program works to strengthen international security by diagnosing acute nuclear risks, informing debates on solutions, and engaging international actors to effect change. 59–88; and Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. As George Perkovich notes, the emergence and crystallization of the Chinese threat in 1962–64 caused India's Congress Party to choose a middle-ground strategy: “[They] wanted neither to undertake nor exclude a bomb program but instead to study the issue seriously and enhance technological preparedness.”69 The only constraint on weaponization was a fractured domestic consensus—particularly at the prime ministerial and cabinet levels—on whether nuclear weapons, rather than seeking universal global nuclear disarmament to denuclearize China and prevent Pakistani nuclearization, were the answer to India's security predicament. Instead, I show that the delay was a strategic and intentional calculation, a fact missed by most existing accounts.61, India pursued a technical hedging strategy from 1948 to 1964, focusing on civilian nuclear technology—a reactor and reprocessing capability—for economic development. Through intensive case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, Atomic Assurance shows that it is easier to prevent an ally from ... 2 (Fall 2011), pp. Rajiv nevertheless allowed India's scientists to maintain a very “minimum state of readiness” in the late 1980s,84 although much of their work focused on protecting India's infrastructure and military installations from a nuclear attack.85, The second indicator of hard hedging in this period is that all decisionmaking was carefully concentrated in the prime minister's office so that the prime minister alone could control—and restrain—the nature and pace of the program. Both costs—the risk of military prevention or other coercive measures—and opportunities, if a state benefits from major power immunity, dictate the optimal proliferation strategy. There are three alternative explanations for India's nuclear proliferation saga. Bilateral arms control between the United States and Russia now rests entirely on New START, which will expire in 2026 if not sooner. What can states and international organizations do to reduce immediate nuclear risks while planning for a longer term disarmament process? First, India went through several phases in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, shifting from technical hedging to hard hedging before finally sprinting to acquisition beginning in 1989. On average, states pursuing nuclear weapons face more armed conflict—an additional militarized dispute per year—through the process of nuclear acquisition.15 There is an intense “window of volatility” for proliferators in the decade prior and subsequent to acquisition. India had demonstrated mastery of a controlled fission detonation. Pant, the junior minister of energy, stated: “[T]here is no question of our going in for nuclear weapons,” that India's PNE was “exclusively for peaceful purposes.” He also stated that India's refusal to sign the NPT was a response to its discriminatory structure—separating nuclear haves from have-nots—not a result of India wanting nuclear weapons—yet.72. For example, knowing that a state under a nuclear umbrella might be an insurance hedger and not a hard hedger allows one to isolate the possibility that changes in alliance commitment or the rise of an acute threat might trigger nuclear weapons breakout. Morarji Desai, “Rajya Sabha Q&A on the Nuclear Explosion at Pokhran in 1974,” December 21, 1978, Indian Nuclear History collection, Wilson Center Digital Archive, p. 136, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119759. 2 (2015), pp. Although India had faced a nuclear and conventionally superior China for decades, which forced it to select a hard hedging strategy, it was the prospect of Pakistani weaponization coupled with the recognition that universal disarmament was a nonstarter that ultimately killed Rajiv's, and thus domestic political, opposition to weaponizing India's nuclear program.112 It was only at this point that India undertook a sprinting strategy. Nuclear acquisition theory privileges a state's security environment but explicitly suggests that domestic political consensus is also a crucial variable: the decision to actively pursue nuclear weapons must be filtered through, and subject to, a domestic political process in which a consensus for weaponization emerges. 25, No. Here are the possible solutions for "Nuclear proliferation" clue. When a state calculates that it is not vulnerable to economic or military prevention, it can pursue nuclear weapons openly and prioritize speed of acquisition, because it is immaterial if other states are aware of its intentions. 26, No. On nuclear ambivalence, see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (New York: St. Martin's, 1998). 54–86. Hard hedging persisted across the tenures of several Indian prime ministers. Given the multitude of reasons why a domestic consensus on nuclear weapons may or may not exist, it is difficult to identify a generalizable explanation for the sources of consensus or fracture. Hiding has rarely been successful, however, because maintaining complete secrecy against a global intelligence apparatus designed to detect hidden nuclear weapons programs is difficult.30 Nevertheless, some states, such as South Africa and North Korea, did achieve a nuclear weapons capability using a hiding strategy.31 Thus, even a small prospect of success may tempt states to pursue this strategy because of the huge upside. The third alternative explanation for Indian proliferation strategies is Jacques Hymans's theory of oppositional nationalism, which is a domestic political explanation focusing on the “oppositional” nationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) versus the “sportsmanlike” nationalism of the Congress Party, with the former being more likely to demonstrate Indian power and prowess with nuclear weapons.116 This theory would predict that India would acquire nuclear weapons only under the oppositional nationalist BJP, whereas Congress was content to stop short. Some programs could be vulnerable to covert action or sabotage; others require a single or sustained air strikes to destroy critical infrastructure; still others are dispersed and expansive enough to require a full-scale ground invasion to destroy. Nuclear acquisition theory provides a framework for thinking about how states pursue nuclear weapons. In support of this presidential mandate, the Energy Department — specifically the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) — is responsible for ensuring the integrity and safety of the nation’s nuclear weapons, advancing nuclear nonproliferation and promoting international nuclear safety. 1: The Role of Theory (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. The program’s work spans deterrence, disarmament, nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear energy. This combination of a deteriorating security environment and global derogation of disarmament helped solidify a domestic consensus for weaponization. Simply put, a nuclear war could end most life on Earth. Russia remains a source of illicit sensitive technology pertaining to missile proliferation. Contact author for any desired robustness checks. For example, Jacques Hymans's work focuses on how efficiently states achieve their nuclear ambitions, but assumes that all nuclear pursuers try to develop a nuclear weapons capability as quickly as possible.7. Jamie Kwong is the Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Table 1 lists the potential indicators for the three varieties of hedging. When nuclear cooperation with the United States resumed in 1958, the British deployed State Survival Theory Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons and the technology used to produce such weapons, and to the process by which a state develops and/or comes into possession of nuclear weapons (US Department of Defence 2005). Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister after his mother's assassination, in 1984. 4 (September 2015), pp. In an increasingly crowded, chaotic, and contested world and marketplace of ideas, Carnegie offers decisionmakers global, independent, and strategic insight and innovative ideas that advance international peace. Although knowing why states might want nuclear weapons may enable one to mitigate the demand for such weapons, these underlying motivations—for example, a state's security environment or a desire for prestige—are difficult to manipulate. Because the state is facing an acute security threat alone, such hedging is likely to be hard rather than technical or insurance hedging, moving the state closer to the finish line if a consensus emerges. Nuclear proliferation is the increase in the amount of nuclear weapons a country has, or the spread of nuclear capabilities to non-nuclear countries. The claim has long been made that the development and expansion of commercial nuclear power led to nuclear weapons proliferation, because elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (including uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing) can also serve as pathways to weapons development. Hiding is a high-risk, high-reward strategy. 4. Full coding appendix available upon request. This is a study of the political strategies of acquisition, but the technical pathways to nuclear weapons are also important. 87–119. The second is that states seek to do so as quickly as possible. Fifth, I present evidence and codings on the empirical universe of nuclear pursuers.1 Although a definitive test of the theory is beyond the scope of this article, in the sixth section, I provide evidence, including new details, from India's long march to acquiring nuclear weapons that establishes the analytical power of the theory. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is certainly true that an extremely acute security environment may catalyze domestic consensus.46 The inconsistency with which domestic actors accurately assess and respond to the external security environment means, however, that variation in unit-level consensus can exert independent influence on a state's strategy. The parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) now include 185 countries which have renounced the nuclear path, as well as five nuclear-weapon states that … Second, the inefficiency of hiding strategies— given the requirement of maintaining a small signature against global intelligence capabilities—may allow more time to detect and stop hiders before they acquire nuclear weapons. This question is important because how states try to acquire nuclear weapons—their strategies of nuclear proliferation—affects their likelihood of success and thus the character of the nuclear landscape. Don’t close the page if you need other answers from the same crossword. Join experts and officials from around the world to debateâand explore solutions forâthe most pressing challenges in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, disarmament, deterrence, energy, and security. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict [Van Creveld, Martin] on Amazon.com. In No Use, national security scholar Thomas M. Nichols offers a lucid, accessible reexamination of the role of nuclear weapons and their prominence in U.S. security strategy. This typology is mutually exclusive—nuclear pursuers fall into one category or another. 149–162. That pressure did not, however, affect India's proliferation strategies or force India to hide or roll back its program.115 Instead, the perceived discriminatory nature of these treaties empowered those in India who wanted to accelerate the program and testing sequence before they might go into force. Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2010 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict Studies, Security, grade: Good, European University at St. Petersburg, course: Security and Disarmament in Europe ... Existing Proliferation Scholarship: Focusing on Why, Not How Why is an analysis of the strategies of proliferation necessary? 79–114; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan, 2002); and K. Subrahmanyam, “India's Nuclear Policy 1964–98 (A Personal Recollection),” in Jasjit Singh, ed., Nuclear India (Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1998), pp. Indira and, in particular, Rajiv, enjoyed large parliamentary majorities and were the dominant figures in the Congress Party. See Thomas Jonter, The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). For all practical purposes, however, India's nuclear weapons sprint initiated in 1989 was complete by 1994.111. 233–266. Lal Bahadur Shastri quoted in Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, p. 95. First, there may be some reverse causality whereby increased levels of duress further motivate pursuit of nuclear weapons. One exception is Jacques E.C. Today's crossword puzzle clue is a quick one: Nuclear proliferation. There are two relevant considerations, in sequence. If a state faces an acute security threat alone, the next crucial variable is whether there is domestic consensus for nuclear acquisition. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons faces many challenges. This book addresses the likely effects of the CTB on nuclear weapon programmes and decision making in the nuclear weapon states, the threshold states and the non-nuclear weapon states of proliferation concern. Instead, the state may find itself in a transactional client-patron relationship with a major power that is complicit in, or at least tolerant of, its nuclear weapons pursuit and offers immunity against external coercion. There is thus analytical utility in disaggregating the proliferation process: not all proliferators pursue nuclear weapons capabilities the same way. Why do they select particular strategies to develop them, and how do these choices affect the international community's ability to prevent nuclear proliferation? Empirical codings from the universe of nuclear pursuers, combined with a detailed plausibility probe of India's long march to acquiring nuclear weapons—including novel details—establish the analytical power of the theory. What steps could build on this treaty, and how can China and other nuclear states be brought into the arms control process? The decision tree makes a prediction for the strategy chosen by a given state at a given point in time, based on the values taken by a sequence of variables at that time. It opens a window of protection against the major power patron, during which the client can attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, while the patron's diplomatic and military protection provides the client cover against other external powers. Furthermore, Rajiv approved a slate of highly visible public tests for explicitly nuclear-capable missiles, particularly the longer-range Agni missile, beginning in May 1989.103 This was not a hiding strategy, but a sprint to swiftly take India from a nuclear hedger to a nuclear weapons state. It was only after Rajiv's Action Plan—his final effort to advance global nuclear disarmament and the last chance, he believed, of stopping Pakistan from nuclearizing—fell on deaf ears at the United Nations in June 1988 that Rajiv began to consider changing India's proliferation strategy. The sheltered pursuit strategy is appealing because it allows a state to proliferate under an umbrella of protection. These are the states that should be most likely to abandon pursuit on their own, without outside nudging. Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. 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